The opinion of the court was delivered by

FISHER, P.J.A.D.

In this appeal, we consider whether plaintiff is bound to arbitrate his claims against his former employer. Because the employee handbook, which contains an arbitration clause and a purported waiver of plaintiff's right to sue, clearly conveyed that its "rules, regulations, procedures and benefits ... are not promissory or contractual in nature and are subject to change by the company," we agree with the motion judge that plaintiff did not clearly and unambiguously waive his right to sue defendants in court.

On September 19, 2014, plaintiff Grant W. Morgan commenced this action against his former employer, defendant Raymours Furniture Company, and two Raymours representatives, alleging a violation of the Law Against Discrimination, N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 to -49, wrongful termination, and other similar causes of action. After unsuccessfully moving for a change of venue — an application that might fairly suggest a waiver of the right to arbitrate1 — defendants moved to compel arbitration. That motion was denied as well, and defendants appeal, as is their right despite the interlocutory nature of the order in question. See R. 2:2-3(a).

In appealing, defendants present the following arguments:

In light of well-established legal principles governing the availability of arbitration in this and similar settings, reiterated in a number of recent cases, see, e.g., Atalese v. U.S. Legal Servs. Grp., L.P., 219 N.J. 430, 444-45, 99 A.3d 306 (2014), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 135 S.Ct. 2804, 192 L.Ed.2d 847 (2015); Barr v. Bishop Rosen & Co., 442 N.J.Super. 599, 605-609, 126 A.3d 328 (App.Div.2015),3 we find insufficient merit in defendants' arguments to warrant further discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). We add only the following brief comments.

The circumstances at hand are relatively simple. Plaintiff contends that upon complaining of age discrimination in the workplace, defendants confronted him with an ultimatum — that he either sign a stand-alone arbitration agreement or defendants would terminate his employment. Plaintiff refused to sign the agreement and defendants carried out their threat. Plaintiff was terminated and this suit followed.

Despite plaintiff's refusal to sign an arbitration agreement, defendants moved to compel arbitration on the basis of the company handbook. Although plaintiff disputes that he actually read or acknowledged receipt of the handbook, he consented to the trial court's consideration of these issues on the assumption that he acknowledged receipt of the handbook and EAP in August 2011, February 2012, and April 20134; like the trial judge, we find these circumstances unavailing.

For example, the handbook is prefaced with the employer's disclaimer as to the nature of the parties' undertaking:

In addition, when electronically acknowledging receipt of this documentation, an employee signifies only that he or she "received a copy of the Associate Handbook" (emphasis added), and, further, that he or she

These disclaimers were likely included because of Woolley v. Hoffman-LaRoche, Inc., 99 N.J. 284, 309, 491 A.2d 1257, modified, 101 N.J. 10, 499 A.2d 515 (1985), where the Court determined that company manuals may create implied contractual rights and duties, but that employers — to avoid this possibility — could include a prominent disclaimer of the contractual nature of a handbook.

Here, the employer would seek both the benefit of its disclaimer in most instances, while insisting that the handbook was contractual when it suits its purposes — a proposition to be rejected if for no other reason than it runs counter to the ancient English proverb: "wolde ye bothe eate your cake, and haue your cake?" John Heywood, Dialogue of Proverbs (1546), as well as its corollary, which may have originated with Aesop, "sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander." Of course, our decisions are not governed by clichés, but these in particular can be found at the root of the court's equity jurisdiction. For example, estoppel principles preclude a party from disavowing a previous position if repudiation violates the demands of justice and good conscience. Carlsen v. Masters, Mates & Pilots Pension Plan Tr., 80 N.J. 334, 339, 403 A.2d 880 (1979); Connell v. Am. Funding, Ltd., 231 N.J.Super. 409, 416, 555 A.2d 745 (Ch.Div.1987), aff'd o.b., 231 N.J.Super. 202, 555 A.2d 638 (App.Div.1989). In this setting, it is simply inequitable for an employer to assert that, during its dealings with its employee, its written rules and regulations were not contractual and then argue, through reference to the same materials, that the employee contracted away a particular right. See also 2 Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence § 385, at 52 (5th ed.1941) (recognizing "that whatever be the nature of the controversy between two definite parties, and whatever be the nature of the remedy demanded, the court will not confer its equitable relief upon the party seeking its interposition and aid, unless he had acknowledged and conceded, or will admit and provide for, all the equitable rights, claims and demands justly belonging to the adversary party, and growing out of or necessarily involved in the subject matter of the controversy").5

In any event, our Supreme Court has made clear that an employee in this circumstance must "clearly and unambiguously" agree to a waiver of the right to sue. Atalese, supra, 219 N.J. at 443, 99 A.3d 306. By inserting such a waiver provision in a company handbook, which, at the time, the employer insisted was not "promissory or contractual," an employer cannot expect — and a court, in good conscience, will not conclude — that the employee clearly and unambiguously agreed to waive the valued right to sue. And, by the same token, in obtaining the employee's signature on a rider, which stated only that the employee "received" and "underst[ood]" the contents of the company handbook or rules and regulations, the employer cannot fairly contend the employee "agreed" to a waiver of the right to sue that might be found within those materials. Leodori v. CIGNA Corp., 175 N.J. 293, 307, 814 A.2d 1098, cert. denied, 540 U.S. 938, 124 S.Ct. 74, 157 L.Ed.2d 250 (2003); Barr, supra, 442 N.J.Super. at 609 n. 5, 126 A.3d 328. These principles preclude enforcement of the arbitration provision and waiver of the right to sue contained within Raymours' company handbook and related documents.6

We also reject defendants' forceful argument that such a determination conflicts with federal law. We disagree on the strength of our Supreme Court's own prior rulings, cited above, regarding the relationship between federal and state law in such matters. We also note that one week after we heard argument in this case, a federal court of appeals came to the same conclusion that we now reach in nearly identical circumstances. Lorenzo v. Prime Commc'ns, L.P., 806 F.3d 777 (4th Cir.2015).

We lastly recognize that had plaintiff executed the stand-alone arbitration agreement presented to him when a rift formed in the parties' relationship, a different outcome would likely have followed. To that we only need say, "if my grandmother had wheels, she'd be a bicycle."

Affirmed.